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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. C A S E N 0 . 
KELVIN TAYLOR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NA'l'URE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of a guilty verdict 
-entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, for the crime of Theft, a second degree 
felony. 
DISPOSITION IN '!'HE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was convicted on the 11th day of January, 1978 
on theft of a firearm in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-404 and u.c.A. 
§76-6-412. Defendant was sentenced to a term of one (1) year 
-to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison. The matter at 
trial was heard before a jury. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction, or failing 
that, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was charged with exercising unauthorized 
control over a firear!; belonging to John Myers in violation 
' 
of u.c.A. § 76-6-404 and"'§ 76-6-412. The date of the charged 
violation was September 9, 1977. 
The State called l-1ark Myers; John F. Myers; John 
Perrero; and Utah County Sheriff Deputy Frank Wall. Defendant 
called Lamar Langdon, police officer from Spanish Fork City, 
State of Utah; Kenneth Lynn Mower; and the defendant, Kelvin 
Taylor. 
l 
Mark Myers stated that he was acquainted with the def- I 
end ant, Kelvin Taylor. He also stated how he had met the defer.· 
I 
dant. 
"DIRECT EXAMINATION" 
Q Would you please state your name? BY MR. WEIGIIT 
A Mark Myers. 
Q Where are you presently staying, rtr. Myers? 
A Utah State Penitentiary, B-Block 207. 
Q Are you acquainted with Kelvin Taylor? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When did you first meet him? 
A I met him at a 90-day diagnostic unit, Utah State Penitenti~· 
Q D::> you remenber when that was? 
A It was the first part of March. 
(2) 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
MR. CARI'ER: Your Honor, may I object? 
THE CUJRT: Just a minute. 
MR. CARI'ER: I'd at this tine object and 
reaffirm my notion for objection on the basis of my forner 
notion. 
THE <XlURI': Yes, you may. The record may 
so show. You have a standing objection, arrl your objection 
is overruled. You may proceed. 
(By Mr. \'Eight) By date do you know approximately the day 
or nonth when you met Mr. Taylor? 
I don't know the exact date, but I went out to 90-Day diag-
nostic unit. 
Okay. Were you in the Halfway House about the 6th day of 
September last year? 
Yes, that's the day I left from the Halfway House." 
This line of questioning was only preceded by the 
prosecutor's opening statement by Mr. Weight: 
"This case involves the theft of a rifle, the rifle was 
a 30-06. It occurred on the 9th day of September, 1977. Prior to 
that time the defendant was an ao:ruaintance of a Mark Myers. Mark 
Myers is presently in the Utah State Prison. At the tine of September 
6th and prior to that time he was in the Halfway House on a rehabilita-
tive program from the prison, and he was aiven opportunities through 
(3) 
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the Halfway House to have privileges to leave the facility and \\Ork 
and his restraint was not quite as great as it 1.10uld be as if he were 
at the prison itself. On the 6th day of September or al:xmt that day 
Mr. Myers, wh::> knew the defendant because they had been together in 
that halfway house facility at a time prior and had met there, left 
the Halfway House and did not return as he was suppossed to do." 
Based upon such statements by the prosecutor, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial. (T. page 7-8) 
Mark Myers further testified: 
Q "Now what do you mean your plans changed when you met girls? 
A Well, \>hen I went da.vn to pick uo Kelvin to go up and do sare 
hunting, he had t\10 girls and one guy that ran away from North Dakota, 
and I ccrrpletely changed plans fran going Uf) hunting. I took the 
people that slept outside and took them up to my house in Fannington 
and fed them, gave them a nice hot shc:Mer, and then we -- then I qot 
in trouble with the Halfway House and that's when we decided to run." 
Again, Mr. Myers commented about certain runaways: 
(T. 13) 
A "Yes. I gave the runaways a hot meal and a hot shower arrl a 
decent bed to sleep in." 
Mr. Myers then testified as to the defendant stealinc 
gas for Mr. Myer' s car. (T. 15) 
A "The next day we went downtown, and we were running prettY lOI~ 
on gas, so Kelvin the defendant went out and siphoned gas 
for us and put it in my car, ancJ that qot us around." 
(4) 
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Mr. Myers then testified as to a theft of a citizen 
band radio and a 2,000 watt candle power spot light. (T.l8) 
Q After you discovered that tre rifle was missing 
did you contact the defendant? ' 
A No, not when I found out the rifle was missing. 
The first thing I did, I went to Springville to 
the particular pawn shop. 
Q Why did you do that? 
A Because when I first discovered the c.b. was missing, 
Kelvin Taylor told me that he left, he hal a flat 
tire in Santaquin Canyon, and he left my car and 
went to town to get a new tire for it, and he said 
when he got back the c.b. was stolen. 
Q Okay. Why did you go to tre Tip 'Ibp? 
A I went to the Tip 'Ibp because I wasn't very sure to 
myself that it was stolen, and because I knew it was 
a pawn shop, because I ran low on rroney, and I hal a 
fuzz roster and a 100 watt -- llO watt leaner for my 
c.b. that I owned myself and paid for. I took it in 
there and pawned it off myself, and then went out and 
put gas in my car, then we tcok Holly and Kelvin over 
to Provo and got sonething to eat. And then when I 
went down there this time I asked the lady --
Q let me stop you right there. When you say "this time", 
what time are you --
A I'm talking al:xmt the time I found out the c.b. was 
missing. 
Q Okay, go ahead. 
A I walked in there, and there was a lady behirrl the 
counter, and I says, "Do you mind if I look in your 
stockroom and see if my stolen material is in here?" 
And she first refused. And I says, "Well, look, I'll 
put my hands in the air. I ~m' t touch nothing. I 
just want to know to myself if it: s in here: " Then 
she finally agreed, and I walked m there w:th my 
harris in the air, and I looked over to my nght and 
my dad's 06 was laying there and my c.b. and my 
2,000 candle watt power spot light was there, and I 
looked at the ticket and it said "Kelvin Taylor". By 
that time I was so mad I oculdn' t even talk· " 
(5) 
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Detective Sargeant Frank Wall, Utah County Sheriff's 
Department, later took the stand and testified. Mr. Wall 
testified as to the defendant being on probation and other 
charges being investigated. (T. 48-49) 
A "Yes. I asked him, I said, "Kelvin, you realize 
that this w::mld violate you, being in possession 
and doing this with the firearm?" And re said 
"Yes". I asked him if his probation officer had 
been notified, and he said, "No." So at that time 
we called his probation officer and talked with him. 
Q Was that the substance of the conversation specifi-
cally about the rifle? 
A Well, he agreed to, you know, if we could help him 
out in any way on any of the charges that re would 
provide us with sane information as to the where-
abouts of Mark Myers, the runaway from the Halfway 
House." 
Officer Wall then testified as to the defendant being 
on parole and why he would want to violate his parole. (T.49) 
A "We had talked about his being involved in the situa-
tion and I asked Mr. Taylor why he would want to violate 
his parole and take the chance again, and re indicated 
that Mr. Myers asked him to go down and sell trese 
things to get food and that was the reason why he had 
sold these items." 
Officer Wall then elaborated on the defendant being in 
prison and the possibility of going back to prison. (T.SO) 
" ••• And as we were heading into the jail itself he " 
said, "Well, I guess this will put rre back in pnson. 
And I said, "Well, it looks like it. You probably should 
have thought about it a little more before you got 
involved with Mr. Myers" ... 
(6) 
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1, 
I' i 
Officer Wall then testified as to his involvement 
with the defendant on previous occassion. (T. 50-51) 
" ••• And I asked Kelvin, I felt pretty bad 
because I had helped him out in previous and 
I felt that he hadn't been honest to me ••• " 
The State rested and the defendant Kelvin Taylor, 
through his counsel, moved for a mistrial on the basis of 
the prejudicial information above mentioned. (T. 56) 
POINT I: 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES 
OR CIVIL WRONGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM 
THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION. 
The prosecuting attorney in his opening statement comment-
ed that the defendant had been in the Halfway House with 
one Mark Myers. Mr. Myers, upon questioning of the prosecuting 
attorney, stated that he had met the defendant at a 90-day 
Diagnositc Unit, Utah State Penitentiary. 
The prosecutor even elicited the time that the defendant 
was in the Penitentiary, the first part of March. (T.l0-11) 
Mr. Myers again prejudiced the defendant by implicating 
the defendant with assisting and associating with runaways 
from North Dakota. (T.l2) Mr. Myers related how the defen-
dant had stolen some gas. (T.l5) Thereafter, Mr. Myers re-
(7) 
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lated how the defendant had also stolen a citizen band 
radio and a spot light. 
The prosecutor called Officer Frank Wall and elicit~ 
from that Officer that the defendant was on probation. (T.48): 
that the defendant was on parole (T.49); that the defendant 
had been in prison and would probably go back to prison (T.S~I 
and that the defendant had been involved in other incidents 
involving violations of the law. (T. 50) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides: 
"Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person rommitted a cri.Ire 
or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to 
prove his disposition to canmit =ime or civil wrong as the 
basis for an inference that he cCllmlitted anotl:Er crime or 
civil wrong on anotl:Er specified occasion but, subject to 
Rule 45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when relevant 
to prove some other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge or identity." 
In State v. Kazda, 14 u. 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (19631 
the defendant there was convicted of assault with intent to 
commit robbery and murder. The State called an FBI agent 
that had interviewed the defendant after the defendant h~ 
been arrested and incarcerated in Medford, Oregon. The 
the defendant had informed him that he \vas agent stated that 
with two other men when they had shot and killed the victim. ! 
The prosecutor further elicited from the agent that the defe·, 
dant was incriminated in other crimes, including murder 
( 8) 
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occuring in other states, which the defendant denied to 
the agent. Further, that the defendant admitted being 
arrested for a robbery in Nebraska and that there were 
two outstanding warrants for the defendant's arrest in 
Nebraska. 
The Court reversed the verdict and stated: 
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error. 
It implied that the defendant was implicated in other 
crimes, none of them proven, and could have no other 
effect than to degrade the defendant and give the jury 
the impression that he had a propensity for crime." 
Also, State v. Dixon, 12 U. 2d B, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961) 
where the defendant, on trial for robbery, was questioned 
concerning a criminal incident in which the defendant had 
been involved but not convicted. The Court found the inci-
dent to be immaterial to the matter before the Court. 
In State v. Hartman, 101 U. 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941), 
the Court states that an attempt to get into evidence the 
prejudicial reference to another crime, such attempt might 
well be grounds for a mistrial not only on the grounds of 
prejudice, but as a proper expression of the Court's strong 
disapproval for such tactics. 
In State v. Huggins, 18 U. 2d 219, 418 P. 2d 978 (1966) 
the State introduced in a prosecution for molesting two girls, 
evidence of another act by the defendant suppossedly that same 
day with a ten (10) year old girl. There the Court was 
( 9) 
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shocked and stated that such evidence: 
" ... offends fair play and raises constitutional 
questions." 
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs should not 
be brought into evidence for the purpose of disgracing t~ 
defendant nor for the purpose of showing a propensity to 
commit the crime charged. State v. Mason, (Utah 1975) 
530 P 2d 795; State v. Schieving, (Utah 1975) 535 P. 2d 
1232; State v. Kasai, 27 u. 2d 326, 495 P. 2d 1265 (1975); 
State v. Baran, 25 U. 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728 (1970); and 
State v. Ahrens, 25 U. 2d 222, 479 P. 2d 786 (1971). 
In People v. Velarde, (Colo. App. 1975) 541 P. 2d 107, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals found evidence that the defen-
dant had been in prison, required reversal. There, the~~~. 
dant, in a third degree felony burglary case, appeared as 
his own witness. His defense attorney inquired whether the 
defendant had been convicted of any felonies. The defendant i 
stated that he had. Upon cross-examination, the prosecutina 
attorney inquired as to two other felonies in 1957 and 1967 
The defendant stated that he had not been convicted. lin 19:·) 
In 
the defendant had been convicted of a juvenile offense. 
1967, the defendant had been convicted but such convictior. 
was reversed with the case bein<J retried.) Yet, the prosec-
tor asked the defendant about his incarceration in prison. 
I l o) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In that case, the court found: 
11 It is elementary that in a criminal trial to a 
j~, ~vidence of defendant's criminal activity, 
which ~s unrelated to the offense charged, is in-
admissible when reference is !1\3.de in the presence 
of the jury to such criminal activity, a mistrial 
is norll\3.lly required ... 11 
The Court further declared that the question regarding 
the defendant being incarcerated in prison to be especially 
objectionable. Similar to Officer l>qall' s testimony in the 
present case, a police officer in Velarde, (supra) testified 
that when he heard about the theft that he immediately ''thought 
of the Valarde brothers. 11 The Court stated that such testimony 
was prejudicial and should have been stricken. 
Another case analagous to the present case is Van Gorham 
v. State, (Okla Cr. 1970) 475 P. 2d 187. In Van Gorham, the 
State called a police officer who was cross-examined as to an 
alleged confession by the defendant regarding an Oklahoma 
crime. The officer interjected in the answer that the defen-
dant had stated that: " ... he was on parole fran Kansas. 11 Further, 
the prosecuting attorney questioned the defendant's Father as 
follows: 
Q "At that time was he (defendant) on parole from 
Kansas?" 
The prosecutor asked the defendant's Mother the following: 
Q 
I\ 
"All right, has he ever given you any trouble 
in the past? 
He has been in some trouble in the past, yes sir. 
( ll) 
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Q What kind of trouble? 
A It was some trouble in Y-ansas. 
Q Well, in Kansas. Alright, what kind of trouble? 
A It was stealing some household goods out of a house. 
Q Was he convicted of that crime? 
A Yes, sir, he was. 
Q Was he sentenced by the Court? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you know what that sentence was? 
A One to ten years, I believe, arrl suspended. " 
The testimony was elicited from the witness before the 
defendant took the stand and the Court found such testimony 
was clearly inadmissible and could serve no purpose at that 
time, but to prejudice the defendant. To admit the testi-
mony of prior conviction before the defendant takes the su~ 
in a two stage proceeding was " ... error of the worst kirxl." 
See also Eubanks v. State, (Alaska 1973) 516 P. 2d 726, 
where the prosecution introduced evidence of heroin use in a 
theft case. The Court there found the prejudicial effect c: 
associating the defendant with heroin is great and reguir~ 
reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence that the defendant met Mr. Myers \vi thin the 
( 12) 
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prison system was clearly of a prejudicial nature. No 
purpose can be contended that incarceration in a penal 
institution is relevant to show absence of mistake or 
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, or identity. Such evidence does no more than 
degrade the defendant and give the jury the impression that 
he had a propensity to commit the crime. 
Evidence that the defendant had been on probation and 
parole is inadmissible in that it is not relevant to prove 
a material fact. Evidence that the defendant had siphoned 
gasoline without permission ahs no relevancy to material 
issues of the case; nor does the fact that he assisted run-
aways from North Dakota. 
When culminated into a whole, the admission of the 
evidence relating to incarceration in prison, parole, proba-
tion, theft, and assisting runaways, does such a prejudicial 
damage to the defendant, it requires a mistrial, or at the 
minimum an exclusion of that evidence. 
DATED this lf:S)IL day of May, 1978. 
~~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
(13) 
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